We study the e¤ects of envy on relational employment contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which re ‡ects an agent's individual contribution to …rm value. Both agents exhibit horizontal disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we …nd that inequity aversion may be bene…cial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more pro…table. For some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with envious agents.
Introduction
The present paper investigates how concerns for fairness among agents affect the optimal provision of incentives in a one-task framework with only subjective performance measures. In particular, we analyze the impact of horizontal disadvantageous inequity aversion on the principal's credibility in a relational contract. So far the literature has focused on the impact of inequity aversion on the design of explicit incentive contracts. In these environments, employing inequity averse agents comes at a cost for the principal. In contrast to that, we …nd that with implicit incentives the principal might prefer to employ inequity averse rather than inequity neutral agents.
Frequently, if not typically, the agent's true contribution to …rm value cannot be objectively assessed. In many cases, his contribution can, nonetheless, be observed by both contracting parties. The observed subjective performance may be used in implicit agreements (relational contracts). As subjective assessments are not veri…able by third parties, contracts are not court-enforceable and thus have to be self-enforcing. They may be implemented in long-term relationships as reputational equilibria. 2 So far the literature on relational contracts has primarily focused on problems under symmetric information. 3 Apart from that there is an evolving literature analyzing self-enforcing contracts under asymmetric information, in particular moral hazard in e¤ort Murphy (1994, 2002) , Levin (2003) , Kvaløy and Olsen (2006) , and Schöttner (2008) ).
1 Okun (1980) , p. 8. 2 Reputational equilibria may exist if one party cares about her reputation in future relationships. See e.g. Holmström (1981) or Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) .
3 See e.g. Bull (1987) , MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) , and Levin (2002) .
We contribute to the latter strand of literature by analyzing fairness concerns that may arise in multilateral contracting under ex-post asymmetric information.
As the agents' contributions to …rm value are not necessarily perfectly correlated to their e¤orts, agents undertaking the same e¤ort could receive di¤erent rewards. This might provoke envy, empathy, or spiteful behavior among agents, especially if they work on similar tasks. 4 Taking into account the presence of envy among agents, we investigate the feasibility and pro…tability of relational contracts.
We consider an employment relationship between one principal and two risk neutral, not …nancially constrained agents who exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion. We have in mind employees working on similar tasks in small or medium-size …rms or divisions where workers tend to compare their payo¤s with those of their colleagues. 5 Speci…cally, we model preferences as "self-centered inequity aversion", as proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , abstracting from empathy. 6 Neither agent's e¤ort is directly observable by the principal albeit imperfectly correlated with individual performance. The principal seeks to mitigate the resulting moral hazard problem by o¤ering each agent an incentive contract contingent on their respective performances. As observed performance is not veri…able, the contract has to be self-enforcing, i.e. reputation concerns have to restrain the principal from deviating from the incentive contract.
It is well known that, with explicit incentives, more envious agents exert more e¤ort than less envious ones when being o¤ered identical incentive contracts (Grund and Sliwka (2005) , Demougin and Fluet (2006) ). However, to ensure participation, the principal has to pay the inequity averse agents a premium to compensate them for the faced risk of unequal payo¤s (inequity 4 For experimental evidence of other-regarding preferences see e.g. Goranson and Berkowitz (1966) , Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) , Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1998) , and Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger (1997) . 5 For the importance of reference groups, see e.g. Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989) . Of course, an individual's perception of fairness could also include the principal (vertical inequity aversion). However, we are rather interested in inequity averse preferences among agents and the e¤ects thereof for the optimality of employment schemes in the …rm. 6 For alternative approaches regarding the formalization of fairness concerns see e.g. Rabin (1993) , Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) . premium). In this kind of framework, agency costs increase in the presence of inequity aversion as reported by e.g. Bartling and von Siemens (2007) and Grund and Sliwka (2005) . 7 Both results are true for our model as long as only one period is considered. Here, the principal would rather employ inequity neutral than inequity averse agents.
The present paper analyzes how this conclusion is a¤ected under a relational contract. The principal's credibility constraint requires that her gains from reneging fall short of the discounted gains from continuing the relational contract. We …nd that this constraint is ambiguously a¤ected by the presence of envy: On the one hand, the incentive for the principal to deviate from the relational contract in order to save bonus expenses decreases in the propensity for envy. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that envious agents work harder given the same incentive in order to avoid ending up with a lower payo¤ than their colleagues. This facilitates credible commitment on the principal's side. On the other hand, as agents have to be compensated for their disutility incurred by envy, the principal's long-run pro…ts out of the contract decrease as agents become more envious. Consequently, commitment to paying the o¤ered bonus is more di¢ cult.
The sum of these two counteracting e¤ects determines whether credibility is either more or less easily obtained by the principal as agents become more envious. Whenever the savings due to lower bonus payments exceed the loss of future pro…ts via the inequity premium, credibility is enhanced by the degree of envy and, for some range of discount rates, the principal prefers to employ more envious agents.
We identify a necessary and su¢ cient condition under which, for a range of the principal's discount rate, relational contracts are less pro…table or even infeasible when agents do not exhibit any disadvantageous inequity aversion. In that case, envy becomes an advantageous factor in principalagent relationships in the sense that it softens the principal's credibility constraint and more reputational equilibria can be sustained with envious agents.
Our …ndings underline that empirically observed cultural di¤erences in social preferences should not be neglected in organizational decisions when …rms rely on implicit incentives. In particular, the implementation of relational employment contracts might not be possible with inequity neutral agents, if the principal's discount rate is relatively low. Moreover, relational contracts might be more pro…table in countries where people generally exhibit a greater degree of inequity aversion due to cultural di¤erences. For example, Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch (2004) and Corneo (2001) …nd Europeans to exhibit a higher propensity for inequity aversion in comparison to U.S. Americans. 8 Thus, the implementation of relational contracts might be more frequent in countries whose populations are more sensitive to inequity aversion. Taking cultural di¤erences in the degree of inequity aversion into consideration, our …ndings support the empirical analysis by Moriguchi (2005) . She argues that relational contracts are more prevalent in Japan than in the United States pointing out that the United States were hit harder by the Great Depression compared to Japan. This goes along with lower continuation pro…ts and thus results in the less frequent use of relational contracts in the United States. According to our analysis, a depreciation of future pro…ts may have a less severe impact on the feasibility of relational contracts if employees are more strongly inequity averse. Hence, these countries'di¤erences in the propensity for inequity aversion could also play a role for the explanation of di¤erences in institutional arrangements in this context.
Before proceeding with the analysis, two caveat are in order. First, our main analysis focuses on individual bonus schemes. However, other contracts such as peer-dependent compensation schemes might possibly be implemented. We discuss the bene…ts and drawbacks of rank-order tournaments and team bonus contracts within our setting in a supplemental section and relate the …ndings to the results for the individual bonus scheme.
Second, one has to be aware of the fact that for an individual's perception of fairness and equity, many determinants beside the colleague's payo¤ may play a role; e.g. e¤ort, ability, education, gender, status etc. Cognition 8 For a recent empirical cross-country investigation of preferences for redistribution see Isaksson and Lindskog (2007) . The study's …ndings suggest that Swedish, Hungarian, and German people are more supportive of redistribution than U.S. Americans. of inequity is presumably a¤ected by mutual comparisons regarding all the mentioned characteristics. In our model, due to the agents' homogeneity in both preferences and characteristics, di¤erences in payo¤s are the sole source of inequity. Hence, payo¤ inequality accords with inequity.
The next section describes our basic framework. Subsection 2.1 addresses the agency problem in the single-period game. Subsection 2.2 develops the reputation game and thereby the relational contract. In section 3, we examine the impact of the agents'propensity for envy on the relational contracts and derive our main results concerning the principal's credibility problem.
Section 4 discusses alternative compensation schemes. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We consider a repeated game between a principal (the …rm) and two agents who are homogeneous in preferences and characteristics. 9 In each period, agent i, i = 1; 2, chooses an unobservable e¤ort level e i that stochastically determines the agent's contribution to …rm value Y i . That contribution is either high or low; Y i 2 f0; 1g. The signal Y i is observable by all three contracting parties but not veri…able; it can therefore only be used as a performance measure in a self-enforcing relational contract. By exerting e¤ort agent i a¤ects the probability of Y i = 1:
where p (e i ) 2 [0; 1); p (0) = 0; p 0 (e i ) > 0; and p 00 (e i ) < 0. The agents' outputs are stochastically independent.
The principal o¤ers each agent an individual incentive contract consisting of a …xed wage w and a per-period bonus b to be paid if a favorable signal is detected in that respective period. 10 Provided that the principal keeps her promise, the bonus is paid whenever she observes
9 Equivalently, we could assume the principal to employ many agents and approach the problem from the perspective of one agent, all other agents forming his reference group. 1 0 That is we consider payment schemes without memory.
where c (e i ) denotes each agent's costs of e¤ort with c (0) = 0; c 0 (0) = 0; c 0 (e i ) > 0 8 e i > 0; and c 00 (e i ) 0:
Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , both agents exhibit inequity aversion. In particular, we assume them to su¤er only from disadvantageous inequity, i.e. they dislike outcomes where they are worse o¤ than the respective other agent. Each agent observes the other agent's gross monetary payo¤. All parties are risk neutral and not …nancially constrained. For simplicity, the agents'utilities are assumed to be linear in money. Altogether, agent i's per-period utility is given by
where 0 denotes the agents'propensity for envy. The third term thus captures the disutility derived from being worse o¤ than agent j. 11
The timing of events within a period is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the principal o¤ers each agent the above speci…ed compensation contract. Second, the agents either accept the contract or reject it in favor of an alternative employment opportunity that provides utility U 0 . Third, if the agents accept the contract, they simultaneously choose respective e¤ort levels e i . Fourth, Y i is realized and observed by all parties. Finally, the agents receive the explicit …xed wage, and if Y i = 1 the principal decides whether or not to pay the implicit bonus.
The Single-Period Game
To derive the relational contract, we initially consider the single-period game where we assume performance to be objectively assessable, i.e. there is no credibility problem on the principal's side. Given that agent j exerts e¤ort e j ; agent i's expected utility is
1 1 Abstracting from costs, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose the following utility function: Ui = i maxf j i; 0g maxf i j ; 0g; > 0: Incorporating empathy via the parameter would not a¤ect our results qualitatively. For a brief discussion of status preferences, < 0, see section 5. Moreover, Demougin and Fluet (2006) take costs into account when investigating inequity: Ui = i c (ei) maxf j c (ej) i + c (ei) ; 0g. This would change our results neither. However, an inconvenient discontinuity at the symmetric Nash equilibrium would be introduced.
where the last term captures the expected disutility from disadvantageous inequity amounting to the di¤erence in payo¤s b. A symmetric Nash equilibrium is characterized by
In the Appendix, we verify that there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium which is also unique. In equilibrium, the …rst-order condition yields
Thus, given that the agents exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion and are faced with a contract with bonus b, they will undertake e¤ort e, given that (IC) is satis…ed at e. Implicitly this de…nes a function
Proposition 1 Under an individual bonus scheme, with an increasing propensity for envy, the agents exert more e¤ ort for any given bonus.
Proof. Applying the implicit-function theorem to (IC) yields
Intuitively, as envious agents su¤er from being worse o¤ than their coworkers as opposed to non-envious agents, they exert relatively higher levels of e¤ort in order to decrease the probability of not getting the bonus. This incentive-strengthening e¤ect is in line with Demougin and Fluet (2006). 12 In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to it as the incentive e¤ ect.
Hence, in the one-shot game, she sets b; w, and e to maximize expected pro…t per agent subject to participation and incentive compatibility constraints:
Since we assume unlimited liability, the participation constraint binds, leading to zero rent for the agents in the optimal contract. In equilibrium, for each agent we have
The second term on the right-hand side in equation (9) is the inequity premium. Hence, expected wage costs per agent are equal to the sum of his costs of e¤ort, his reservation utility, and the inequity premium. Substituting w and b in the principal's objective function by using (9) and (6), her problem simpli…es to
U 0 : (10) Let e denote the e¤ort level that maximizes the principal's expected one-
Proposition 2 Suppose that performance is veri…able. Then under an individual bonus scheme, (i) the …rst-best solution is obtained if agents are not envious, = 0.
(ii) the …rst-best solution can never be obtained if agents exhibit a propensity for envy, > 0.
(iii) total agency costs increase as agents become more envious.
Proof. As for the …rst part of the claim (i), observe that with = 0, the principal's objective function (10) is
Optimization with respect to e¤ort requires marginal productivity to equal marginal costs of e¤ort such that the …rst-best e¤ort level e = e F B is implemented. To prove (ii), with > 0, in problem (10) the derivative of the inequity premium, p(e) (1 p(e)) c 0 (e) ((1 + p (e)) p 0 (e)) 1 , with respect to e¤ort is non-zero. Hence, pro…t-maximizing e¤ort cannot be …rst-best.
As to (iii), using the envelope theorem, observe that the derivative of (10) w.r.t. is negative as
p(e)(1 p(e)) (p(e) +1)
For the case of non-envious agents, the individual bonus scheme involves zero agency costs. However, when agents are envious the principal faces positive agency costs despite the incentive e¤ect. This result is due to the fact that the principal needs to compensate the agents for the expected disutility from inequity in order to ensure participation. We refer to this wage cost-augmenting e¤ect as the inequity premium e¤ ect. This result is in line with the literature, see e.g. Bartling and von Siemens (2007) and Grund and Sliwka (2005) .
The Repeated Game
To model the relational contract, we embed the foregoing stage game into an in…nitely repeated game, considering trigger strategy equilibria. If the principal reneges on the promised bonus once, no agent will ever again believe her to ful…ll the contract. 13 Hence, the principal's reputation is decisive for her ability to implement relational contracts.
As e¤ort is not observable, agents will exert zero e¤ort if relational contracts are infeasible, corresponding to a closure of the …rm and resulting in a fallback pro…t of zero. If relational contracts are feasible, the principal realizes a continuation pro…t from the long-term relationship, corresponding to expected pro…t V b (e; ) de…ned in (10).
For the relational contract to be self-enforcing, the gains from reneging must fall short of the gains from continuing the relational contract. This is required to hold for all realizations of performance. If both agents perform successfully, Y i = Y j = 1, the principal's incentive to renege on the relational contract is strongest as her resulting one-time bene…t from deviation amounts to twice the bonus. Concerning her reputation, it does not make any di¤erence whether she refuses to pay just one or both bonuses. Thus, due to the separability of the pro…t function across workers
constitutes the credibility constraint of the principal (CC). 14 The optimal relational contract implements e to maximize the principal's expected pro…t per period, subject to her credibility constraint:
Whether condition (CC) can be satis…ed or not, depends on the …rm's interest rate r. To shed light on the interest rate's impact on the optimal relational contract we illustrate the credibility constraint with the help of an example in Figure 1 . Speci…cally, we assume = 0:2; p (e) = 1 exp ( e),
c (e) = 1 8 e 2 ; and U 0 = 0:1. The …gure plots the principal's expected perperiod pro…t V b (e; ). Moreover, the convex curves depict rb (e; ) for various discount rates.
For a su¢ ciently low interest rate the credibility constraint does not bind.
Equivalently to the case of veri…able performance, the optimal relational contract implements the pro…t-maximizing benchmark e¤ort level e . We denote the threshold interest rate for which (CC) becomes binding r. The dashed line illustrates rb (e; ).
The solid curve depicts rb (e; ) for a medium interest rate where (CC) is binding. To ensure credibility on the one hand and to maximize pro…ts on the other hand, the principal will always choose to implement the maximum e¤ort level that just satis…es condition (CC). Geometrically, it is given by 1 4 We derive the rationality constraint analogously to Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) . Note that the interest rate r may be translated into the …rm's discount rate referring to e.g. its patience. Then r = (1 ) = : Hart (2001) emphasizes the discount rate's interpretation as a measure for dependency or trust between the transacting parties. Alternatively, r can be reinterpreted in terms of the likelihood that the …rm disappeares from the market, . In that case r = = (1 ). the highest possible e¤ort level for which V b (e; ) and rb (e; ) intersect.
The …gure illustrates that the optimal e¤ort level declines as the principal's interest rate or the agents'alternative utilities increase. Intuitively, raising the interest rate implies the present value of contract continuation to decrease. Therefore the principal has to reduce the bonus in order to remain credible which implies the implementation of a lower e¤ort level. Analogous arguments apply to an increase in the alternative utility.
As long as the credibility constraint can be ful…lled via adjustment of the implemented e¤ort level for some given r; contracts are feasible. For a su¢ ciently high interest rate condition (CC) can no longer be satis…ed.
The marginal interest rate r for which (CC) can just be ful…lled is characterized by rb (e; ) being tangent to V b (e; ). We denote the e¤ort level implemented at this threshold e. Relational contracts are infeasible for any interest rate larger than the threshold interest rate r. The dotted line, rb (e; ), represents this marginal case.
Bonus Contract
In this section, we analyze the e¤ect of the agents'propensity for envy on the pro…tability and feasibility of the optimal relational contract. Closer examination of condition (CC) reveals the impact of envy to be twofold. On the one hand, as shown in Proposition 1, we observe the incentive e¤ ect; Depending on the overall impact of the agents'propensity for envy on the credibility constraint, the marginal interest rate r increases or decreases. The larger this interest rate is, the greater is the range of interest rates for which the principal may credibly commit and relational contracts are feasible.
Both r and e are implicitly de…ned as the solution of the following 2 2 system consisting of the binding credibility constraint and the tangency condition (see Figure 1 ):
Conducting a comparative-statics analysis of r with respect to ; we derive the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose that performance is non-veri…able. Then an increasing propensity for envy may enhance the feasibility of the relational contract. This is the case, if and only if, at e = e, the following condition holds:
1 5 Mathematically, this follows from equation (6) as
Proof. See the Appendix.
The necessary and su¢ cient condition (14) assures that the incentive e¤ect outweighs the inequity premium e¤ect regarding the credibility constraint. The principal's incentive to renege on the bonus payments is suf…ciently small such that the negative impact of envy on the continuation pro…t is overcompensated. Intuitively, the condition requires the continuation pro…t V b to react less strongly to an increase in the degree of envy than the bonus payment b. 16 Note that satisfaction of the condition demands the sum of e¤ort costs and alternative utility to be smaller than unity which is inherently ful…lled due to the model setup. 17 The smaller this sum the more probable the feasibility-enhancing e¤ect of envy is to arise and the stronger the e¤ect is. 18 Further, from condition (14) can be inferred that the e¤ect is more likely to exist if the precision of the signal is large and the e¤ort elasticity of costs is small. 19 Thus, we …nd that a high propensity for envy may be advantageous for the principal regarding her commitment power. Under the above condition (14), reputational equilibria can be sustained for a greater range of interest rates with envious agents, i.e. the credibility constraint is softened. Hence, there exist cases where the principal can build up a long-term contractual relationship with inequity averse agents and realize pro…ts whereas with inequity neutral agents this is impossible.
Figure 2 qualitatively illustrates our results for the case that condition (14) is satis…ed and, hence, the marginal interest rate r increases in the agents' propensity for envy. The …gure shows the principal's pro…t under 1 6 Mathematically, by equation (30), this is the case if the continuation-pro…t elasticity is smaller in absolute terms than the bonus elasticity both with respect to the degree of envy;
1 7 To verify this observe that the principal's expected pro…t (10) becomes negative once p(e) < c (e) + p(e) (1 p(e)) b (e; ) + U0: In this case, the principal would not engage in the contract. Moreover, p(e) may not exceed unity. Accordingly, c (e) + U0 can never be greater than unity.
1 8 In the Appendix, we illustrate the impact of the alternative utility and the cost function on the e¤ect's magnitude with the help of a numerical example. It reveals the e¤ect to increase with decreasing U0 and c (e).
1 9 Note that condition (14) can be reformulated in terms of elasticities with respect to e¤ort: p (e) > ((c (e) + U0) p (e) + c (e)) = ( p (e) + c (e)), where denotes the elasticity of the success probability, i.e. the precision of the signal, and is the elasticity of costs. As can be seen in the …gure, for a given propensity for envy and su¢ ciently low interest rates r, i.e. interest rates below the lower interest threshold, r r ( ), a relational contract is feasible and the optimal e¤ort level e is implemented by the principal; V b (e ; ) is realized. For a range of interest rates, r ( ) < r r ( ), e¤ort e is adapted such that credibility requirements are ful…lled. Pro…ts in the optimum, V b (e; ), decrease in this range as the interest rate increases. Once the interest rate is larger than the upper interest threshold, r > r ( ), the credibility constraint can no longer be satis…ed by a reduction pf the induced e¤ort level. 21 Hence, relational contracts are infeasible, and pro…ts drop to zero.
2 0 The …gure illustrates the case where the two degrees of envy are not too di¤erent. The case of a large di¤erence in envy is discussed in the text below.
2 1 See the Appendix for numerical examples of the lower and upper interest thresholds; r ( ) and r ( ).
low for conclusions regarding the relative pro…tability of the relational contracts. As illustrated by Figure 2 , the relative performance of the contracts depends on the degrees of envy and the …rm's interest rate. In particular, Proposition 2 implies that for any r < r ( L ) pro…ts with less envious agents exceed those with more envious agents;
Moreover, by Proposition 3, the upper interest threshold r ( ) is increasing in , implying that r ( L ) < r ( H ). For any r in-between the two upper thresholds, i.e. r 2 (r ( L ) ; r ( H )], relational contracts are feasible with more envious agents whereas the principal cannot credibly commit herself when dealing with less envious ones. Thus positive pro…ts are realized only with the former;
Combining Propositions 2 and 3 thus implies that there exists a crit-
continuation pro…ts from employing more envious agents exceed those from employing less envious ones;
Concerning the value of b r, one can distinguish two cases that depend on the particular di¤erence in the degrees of envy. The case of a su¢ -ciently small di¤erence is illustrated in Figure 2 . Observe that in the …gure
. Thus, the two pro…t curves intersect at a value b r < r ( L ), and there is a region of interest rates for which continuation pro…ts from employing more envious agents exceed those from employing less envious ones even if contracts with both types of agents are feasible (shaded area). 22 If, however, the di¤erence in the degrees of envy is su¢ ciently large, the …gure looks slightly di¤erent. Then the dashed curve lies below the solid one
, and the shaded area does not exist. Hence, the principal favors the more envious agents over the less envious ones only if contracts with the latter type of agents are infeasible.
The following corollary summarizes the above derived insights with respect to the bene…cial e¤ects of envy regarding the pro…tability of relational contracts.
Corollary 1 Suppose that performance is non-veri…able and condition (14) is satis…ed, and let H > L 0.
Then there exists a range of interest rates b r < r r ( H ) for which the principal prefers to employ more envious agents over less envious ones. In particular, (i) if the di¤ erence in the agents' degree of envy, H L , is su¢ ciently small, then b r < r ( L ). Thus, there is a range of interest rates b r < r r ( L )
for which relational contracts are feasible with both more and less envious agents but pro…ts with more envious ones are larger (see Figure 2 ).
(ii) if the di¤ erence in the degrees of envy, H L ; is su¢ ciently large, then b r = r ( L ), and pro…ts with more envious agents exceed pro…ts with less envious ones only if relational contracts with the latter are infeasible.
To put it di¤erently, the principal de…nitely prefers to employ more envious over less envious agents whenever commitment is feasible only with more envious ones. Given that agents are not too di¤erent with respect to their propensities for envy, the same holds true for an extended range of interest rates for which, albeit contracts with both types of agents feasible, pro…ts with more envious agents exceed those with less envious ones.
Discussion and Extensions
In the preceding sections we have analyzed peer-independent performance pay and focused on the trade-o¤ between credibility and the costs of inequity aversion. In doing so we have ignored contracts based upon peer-dependent performance evaluation like rank-order tournaments and group bonus contracts. However, these alternative compensation schemes have interesting features in our setup. In particular, the former avoids credibility problems
altogether. Yet, as we will show, this comes at the cost of a larger inequity premium. At the other extreme, a group bonus contract excludes the possibility of unequal pay. We …nd, however, that it ampli…es the credibility problem. In the following, we brie ‡y outline the two alternative types of compensation contracts for the case of envious agents and discuss the implications for our results. In particular, in sections 4.1 and 4.2, we verify that the restriction to individual bonus contracts is meaningful for a range of su¢ ciently high interest rates. Moreover, in section 4.3, we demonstrate that employing more envious agents may still be preferred by the principal, even if she has the choice between contracts based on individual, group, or relative performance.
Group Bonus Scheme
In a group scheme, the principal o¤ers each agent a compensation contract
where w B is a guaranteed …xed wage and
group bonus which is paid contingent upon both agents'performances Y i and Y j in the respective period. Whenever paid out, the group bonus is paid to both agents such that inequity in payo¤s never occurs. Depending on the signals' realizations, the group incentive scheme allows for the implementation of three di¤erent bonus payments, B 01 ; B 10 , and B 11 . A thorough analysis of the group scheme under non-veri…able performance is conducted by Kragl (2008) . In the following, we summarize some of her results which are relevant for the current analysis and their intuition.
In the repeated game, the optimal group scheme implements the smallest possible bonus payment for a given level of e¤ort in order to facilitate credibility. Depending on the value of p (e) at the desired e¤ort level, either of two group bonus schemes is optimal. 23 With p (e) 0:5, a group bonus is paid whenever at least one agent is successful. In contrast, with p (e) > 0:5, a group bonus is paid only if both agents are simultaneously successful.
All results concerning the comparison of the group to the individual bonus scheme equivalently hold for either case. In the following, we only outline the case p (e) 0:5 and discuss the arising trade-o¤.
Assume that the principal promises to pay a bonus B to both agents whenever at least one agent is successful. In the single-period game, agent i's expected utility is
where e i and e j denote the respective e¤ort levels of worker i and his coworker j. Observe that the agents'inequity averse preference structure has no e¤ect on their respective utilities in the presence of the group scheme. In the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the one shot game, the …rst-order condition of (15) yields the incentive-compatible bonus for implementing a given e¤ort level e:
Comparing equations (6) and (16) reveals that the size of the incentivecompatible group bonus B (e) exceeds the size of the individual bonus b (e; )
for any given e¤ort level e and any level of 0. Intuitively, the group bonus introduces a positive externality e¤ect of an agent's e¤ort on the other agent's expected payo¤. As a result, the probability of obtaining the bonus is less responsive to changes in e¤ort in the group scheme than in the individual scheme, and, hence, the group bonus must be larger to elicit an equivalent e¤ort level. Moreover, in contrast to the individual scheme, in the group scheme there is no incentive-strengthening e¤ect of envy.
In the repeated game, the principal sets B; w B , and e to maximize expected pro…ts per agent and period subject to incentive compatibility, participation, and credibility constraints. Given that the participation constraint is binding, we can eliminate w B such that the principal's problem becomes:
From the optimization program can be inferred that, in the group scheme, as long as the interest rate is such that the credibility constraint is not binding, …rst-best e¤ort levels e F B can be implemented, regardless of the agents'propensity for envy. Observe that, by equation (10), this is also true for pro…ts in the individual scheme for the case of non-envious agents, i.e.
V B (r) = V b (r; 0) : However, as the interest rate increases, in both types of contract the respective credibility constraints become binding at some interest rate. Since the group bonus is larger, B e F B > b e F B ; 0 , (CC B )
necessarily becomes binding for a lower value of r than (CC). In other words, V B (r) starts declining for a smaller value of r than V b (r; 0).
Altogether, with non-envious agents, the principal is never worse o¤ using an individual bonus contract as compared to using a group bonus contract, i.e. V b (r; 0) V B (r). Moreover, in section 3 we have shown that for su¢ ciently large interest rates the principal prefers envious agents to non-envious agents using an individual bonus scheme for a range of interest rates. 24 Thus, a fortiori, for this range of interest rates, she also prefers the individual scheme to the group bonus scheme when agents are envious.
We illustrate this result in Figure 3 (a). Observe that the principal indeed prefers the individual bonus scheme for any interest rate r > e r given that agents are envious. (14) is satis…ed.
Rank-order Tournament
In a rank-order tournament, the principal does not face any credibility problem since she can ex ante commit to paying out a given sum of wages in each period. 25 In the current context, suppose she o¤ers a …xed wage w to each agent and distributes a prize among the agents in each period. In particular, she pays to the winner if one exists. When contributions are equal, she pays 2 to each agent. 26 In the single-period game, when exerting e¤ort e i while his co-worker exerts e¤ort e j agent i's expected utility is
In the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the one shot game, the …rst-order condition of (18) yields the incentive-compatible tournament prize for implementing e¤ort e:
Comparing equations (19) and (6), we …nd that the principal has to o¤er a tournament prize larger than the individual bonus for any e and any 0; (e; ) > b (e; ) : Intuitively, by paying out 2 when agents are both either successful or not, the principal avoids the credibility problem but weakens the incentives. Thus, to induce the same e¤ort level, the principal is forced to raise above b: Given that agents are envious, this is not innocuous.
Speci…cally, it lowers the principal's pro…t as shown below.
The principal sets ; w , and e to maximize expected pro…ts per agent and period subject to incentive compatibility, participation, and credibility constraints. Given that the participation constraint is binding, we can eliminate w , and the principal's problem becomes
V (e; ) = p(e) c (e) p(e) (1 p(e)) U 0 ;
Observe that, by equations (10) and (20), tournament pro…ts V ( ) are lower than pro…ts in the individual incentive scheme V b (r; ) for any > 0 and su¢ ciently small interest rates. 27 This is due to the fact that, with envious agents, the relative payment structure induces even higher inequity costs than the individual bonus contract. 28 Note, however, that in contrast to pro…ts from the individual scheme, tournament pro…ts are una¤ected by an increase in the interest rate. Thus, for su¢ ciently high interest rates, the tournament outperforms the individual incentive scheme as the credibility problem becomes paramount in the latter. Figure 3 (b) illustrates this result. For any interest rate r < e e r, the principal prefers the individual bonus contract to the tournamtent when agents are envious. This is true irrespective of whether condition (14) is ful…lled. Yet, if condition (14) holds, the individual bonus contract is superior to the tournament for a greater range of interest rates.
E¤ects of an Increasing Propensity for Envy
In the foregoing section we found that, with envious agents, the individual bonus structure remains preferable for a meaningful range of interest rates.
In the remainder, we show that the intuition of Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 carries over to the comparative analysis of all three incentive schemes.
In particular, we demonstrate that employing more envious agents may still be preferred by the principal even if she can select one of the three considered incentive contracts. Derived from the underlying functions'characteristics, Figure 4 qualitatively illustrates exactly such a case. 29 It sketches optimal pro…ts under the di¤erent incentive schemes for two di¤erent degrees of envy, 0 < L < H . The solid curves depict pro…ts for L , the dashed curves those for H , respectively.
Note that pro…ts in the group scheme are not a¤ected by an increase in . In contrast, tournament pro…ts decrease when increases from L to H for any interest rate. By Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, for the considered increase in , pro…ts in the individual incentive scheme decrease in for interest rates r < b r but increase in for interest rates r > b r as long as a contract is feasible and given that condition (14) holds. The …gure reveals that for any interest rate r 2 b r; b b r , the principal indeed prefers to use the bonus scheme for any interest rate. However, once agents exhibit some propensity for envy, the individual contract is superior for a considerable range of interest rates. 2 8 See Grund and Sliwka (2005) for a comprehensive analysis of the inequity costs in tournaments.
2 9 We replicate Figure 4 by plotting a numerical example in the Appendix. Figure 4: Pro…ts in the individual scheme, the group scheme, and the tournament for two degrees of envy, H > L > 0 given that condition (14) is satis…ed.
individual bonus scheme and to employ more envious agents rather than to implement a tournament with less envious agents and certainly rather than to implement a group scheme. The shaded area depicts the supplemental pro…t the principal may realize by employing more envious agents under an individual bonus contract. Observe that for any pair
. This condition implies that the di¤erence H L must not be too large. Moreover, a su¢ cient condition for the region to exist is
Geometrically, the two individual pro…t curves must hence intersect above the line depicting the tournament pro…t with less envious agents. 30 
Concluding Remarks
We consider optimal individual incentive schemes in a principal-agent relationship with two identical agents who exhibit horizontal disadvantageous inequity aversion. As there are only subjective performance measures available to evaluate the agents'performances, the bonus contracts are enforced in a reputational equilibrium.
The analysis focuses on the impact of the agents' propensity for envy on the principal's commitment power that determines the feasibility of the relational contract. There are two countervailing e¤ects at work: On the one hand, as agency costs increase due to the presence of envy, the principal's pro…ts from the contract decrease as agents become more envious. Thus, continuation of the relational contract becomes less attractive. On the other hand, envy serves as an incentive-strengthening device. This implies that the principal has to pay a lower bonus to implement the same e¤ort given that agents are envious, thereby reducing her bene…t from a one-time deviation.
We identify a necessary and su¢ cient condition assuring that the principal's ability to commit increases as agents become more envious. This implies that the principal prefers to employ more envious agents over less envious ones for a range of high interest rates.
In our paper, we abstract from empathy captured via the parameter > 0 in the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . Some studies claim that people might actually be better o¤ if their payo¤ exceeds the payo¤s of others in their peer group, implying that these people are spiteful and/or show preferences for status. 31 This is contrary to empathy and could be captured by < 0: Assuming this kind of preferences in addition to envy would strengthen our results as status seeking and spitefulness respectively lead to stronger incentives on the one hand and act contrary to the expected disutility from envy on the other hand. 32 Thus, the higher status concerns or spiteful behavior the more probable the positive e¤ect of envy on relational contracts is achieved.
To complete the analysis, we outline two alternative types of contracts, both based upon peer-dependent performance pay. First, we brie ‡y consider a group bonus contract which inherently avoids unequal outcomes and thus implies an inequity premium of zero but ampli…es the credibility problem.
Second, we look at a rank-order tournament where the principal does not face a credibility problem but increased inequity costs instead. We show that there exists a bene…cial e¤ect of envy which carries over to the comparative analysis of all three incentive schemes. 
Proof for Section
The system (13) implies @V b @e e=e b (e; ) V b (e; ) @b @e e=e = 0:
With equation (28), (27) 
To decide upon the e¤ect of on r the sign of equation (29) is crucial:
Substituting V b as given in equation (10) 
Numerical Examples and Plots
The e¤ect of envy on the interest thresholds. For the following numerical example we assume p (e) = 1 exp ( e) and c (e; K) = Ke 2 :such that condition (14) is satis…ed. We consider two exemplary degrees of envy 
